It was by no means an exaggeration that every epoch in modern Russian history was illuminated by some kind of ideology and it constrained people to move on regardless of the realities that they were surrounded. However, the ideological anarchy that existed in Yeltsin era in Russia was followed by his hobnobbing with the Western liberal democracy which eventually resulted in utter failure. Especially, Dugin was responsible for reviving a principle propounded by Sir Halfeld Mackinder on the importance of geopolitics. He argued that that geography, not economics is the pivotal cause of world power and Russia by its intrinsic physical location providing a prime global role.
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By George Barros on July 8, Those who have followed Russian foreign policy in the past five years have probably heard of Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin, his work, and his purported influence on Kremlin elites have been discussed seriously by everybody from the likes of Richard Spencer to Glenn Beck. Dugin, the intellectual leader of Neo-Eurasianism, is anti-globalist, anti-Western, and anti-liberalism.
To meaningfully unpack his idiosyncratic worldview requires hefty analysis. A more than surface-deep look into the Russian zeitgeist reveals that Aleksander Dugin, as controversial and reprehensible as he is, is not the mastermind many in the West frequently and mistakenly make him out to be. Correlation should never be conflated with causation. Many casual Russia observers and armchair Kremlinologists ascribe grand power to the controversial philosopher using speculative evidence based in hearsay.
This myth has grown grossly out of proportion. As a result, Dugin is granted far more credibility than deserved. It is a legitimate question that is difficult for those who have limited regional experience or expert knowledge of analyzing Russian leadership. It is easy to understand why some may conclude that Dugin is influential. Dugin, after all, is a household name in Russia and a reasonably popular author.
One prominent example is how Russian intelligence services exacerbate tensions on historical social cleavages, such as race to sow discord in the United States. According to a colleague with experience in analysis of Russian military leadership, affairs, and doctrine, Dugin receives more attention in the West than in Russia. According to her, not once were Dugin, his writings, or his ideas ever referenced in syllabi, classroom discussions, or personal conversations with Russian thinkers, students, or university faculty.
Exercising my own judgement, I can say that from my own discussions with Russian scholars, academic discussions on this field within Russia do not fixate on Dugin, but instead focus on mainstream names in international relations theory: Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Nye, etc.
Dugin was perhaps influential in the late nineties and early aughts due to his connections to Russian intelligence services. He remains marginally relevant because he functions as a type of informal diplomat to the Western far-right, not dissimilar to how the Kremlin uses Vladimir Zhironovsky, the head of Liberal Democratic Party of Russia which is anything but what the name implies , as a court jester in the Duma to see how the West reacts to his excessively provocative statements.
In this sense, Dugin, like Zhironovsky, serves no practical policymaking purposes, but is rendered somewhat useful as an informal instrument of engagement with strategic foreign audiences, such as fringe far-right thought leaders in the West.
The arguments presented here agree with the conclusions of multiple academic studies. Furthermore, while Dugin is reported to have connections and ties with Russian officials, including the Russian military leadership, and although Russian leaders may cite his work or ideas, it does not appear that he is directly influential in Russian policymaking. He is perhaps best thought of as an extremist provocateur with some limited and peripheral impact than as an influential analyst with a direct impact on policy.
He does not appear to have direct involvement with the major political parties—such as United Russia, the Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Rodina—advocating anti-Western and aggressive regional policies.
Dugin thus largely outweighs small intellectual groups that pursue their own Neo-Eurasianist reflections without having any direct access to a larger public. Dugin even dedicated a whole book to what he calls conspirology. The ideas expressed in it are contradictory. He harshly criticizes the presuppositions about Jewish, freemason, Marxist etc. He is their only substantial thinker, and his theories inspire numerous public figures and movements.
At the same time, his theoretical position is too complex for any party to follow him entirely and turn him into its official thinker. He is also disturbing for the entire camp of Russian nationalism on several points: he condemns populism, which is central to the strategies of the main figures: Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii, and Eduard Limonov.
His occultist leanings, his exacerbated religious sensibility, his rejection of communist ideology but not of the Soviet experience, as well as his ahistorical discourse about Russian grandeur, are his attractive points… Attempts to classify such a doctrine and personality inevitably remain guesswork. That said, Dugin receives far more attention and credibility from the likes of Lauren Southern and the Western alt-right than from Kremlin policymakers.
Dugin fascinates the alt-right with his anti-liberal, anti-globalist, Eurosceptic, and nationalistic rhetoric. These useful idiots along with reactionary journalists grant Dugin far more coverage and legitimacy in the West than the Kremlin elites over which he supposedly wields much influence. If you want to understand who truly influences the Kremlin, look to conservative Russian Orthodox activist and oligarch Konstantin Malofeev , who bankrolled Russian proxy forces in eastern Ukraine, and the early twentieth-century Slavophilic philosopher Ivan Ilyin.
Dugin has no real pull in the Kremlin. His illusions of grandeur are bolstered by his reputation in the Western blogosphere. George Barros is a Washington-based analyst who concentrates on Ukraine and Russia.
He previously worked as a foreign policy advisor for a former member of Congress who served on the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. At best we can only presume it is required reading. Besides a plethora of journalistic hearsay, I have not been able to find any evidence or reliable sources indicating that Foundations of Geopolitics is required reading. The vast majority of journalistic citations to Foundations of Geopolitics are based off of this Wikipedia page , which is by no means authoritative or reliable.
In my own open-source analysis I found a blog post in which Dugin praises the growth of interest in geopolitics as an academic field of study. Dugin makes no indication that Foundations of Geopolitics will be a part of the planned course curriculum for this class. If any readers have evidence or insider knowledge that Foundations of Geopolitics is indeed used as required reading in Russian military academies, please enlighten me.
It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics. Ukrainians are wonderful Slavonic people. And this is a race of bastards that emerged from the sewers.
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John B. Dunlop is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. His current research focuses on the conflict in Chechnya, Russian politics since , Russia and the successor states of the former Soviet Union, Russian nationalism, and the politics of religion in Russia. One perceptive observer of the Russian political scene, Francoise Thom, noted as far back as that fascism, and especially its "Eurasianist" variant, was displacing Russian nationalism among statist Russian elites as a post-communist "Russian Idea," especially in the foreign policy sphere.
The Unlikely Origins of Russia’s Manifest Destiny
To ensure uninterrupted reading, please contact Rachel Mines, sales director, at rachel. However, Mackinder was finally vindicated in the last year of his life by the start of the Cold War, the epitome of his teachings. Since then, geopoliticians have argued, most armed conflicts have always featured a stronger navy against a stronger army. Sea power and land power, in other words, are fated to clash.
The West Overestimates Aleksandr Dugin’s Influence in Russia
Matthew Sharpe works for Deakin Univerisity. He has previously received funding from the ARC to look at religion and political thought, and has previously published on radical conservative thinkers. At issue, the world knows, is the existence, nature and extent of this alleged interference. Then there is the possible collusion in it of people close to Mr Trump and his bid for the Oval Office. To be sure, the times have changed. The Iron Curtain has fallen. Putin is a former KGB man.
Alexander’s Dugin’s Neo Eurasianism in Putin’s Russia
The book has had a large influence within the Russian military, police, and foreign policy elites  and it has been used as a textbook in the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian military. Dugin credits General Nikolai Klokotov of the Academy of the General Staff as co-author and main inspiration,  though Klokotov denies this. Klokotov stated that in the future the book would "serve as a mighty ideological foundation for preparing a new military command". In Foundations of Geopolitics , Dugin calls for the United States and Atlanticism to lose their influence in Eurasia and for Russia to rebuild its influence through annexations and alliances. The book declares that "the battle for the world rule of Russians" has not ended and Russia remains "the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution ". The Eurasian Empire will be constructed "on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism , strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us. Military operations play relatively little role.