INVENTING THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN PDF

The Journal of Military History By Terence Zuber. New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN Terence Zuber's Inventing the Schlieffen Plan aggressively attacks a set of historical shibboleths: that Alfred von Schlieffen prepared a detailed invasion plan for war against France in ; that he favored the doctrine of the unfettered offensive; and that he wanted German troops to sweep west of Paris.

Author:Momuro Mesar
Country:Guyana
Language:English (Spanish)
Genre:Marketing
Published (Last):19 August 2016
Pages:309
PDF File Size:19.36 Mb
ePub File Size:11.54 Mb
ISBN:500-9-21804-310-7
Downloads:56990
Price:Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader:Arabar



The Journal of Military History By Terence Zuber. New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN Terence Zuber's Inventing the Schlieffen Plan aggressively attacks a set of historical shibboleths: that Alfred von Schlieffen prepared a detailed invasion plan for war against France in ; that he favored the doctrine of the unfettered offensive; and that he wanted German troops to sweep west of Paris.

Zuber will have none of this. There was never a Schlieffen Plan, the general actually favored a defensive-offensive approach, and the famous Denkschrift simply represented a plea for additional military manpower.

His earlier articles in War in History prompted fierce retorts from those defending the more familiar Plan in a debate of almost theological intensity. Yet already Zuber's views have become influential, for example, in the first volume of Hugh Strachan's monumental history of the First World War. By arguing that the hapless Helmuth von Moltke wrecked the perfect "Plan," responsibility for the loss could be shifted to one dead general instead of the vaunted General Staff.

The official German history also conveniently omitted the operational plans, making impossible an independent assessment of the roles of Schlieffen and Moltke. Nor did the destruction of many of the army archives make things easier. Gerhard Ritter further reinforced the myth in when, anxious to blame the German generals for militarism, he published the then recently discovered Schlieffen memorandum that had escaped destruction.

Now, thanks to the [End Page ] merger of the East and West German archives, and great diligence by Zuber and others, a more objective examination of the "Plan" is possible.

Zuber starts with a detailed evaluation of the elder Moltke's strategic writings, writings that revealed flashes of great brilliance amid a sea of trite. The general always worried about the risks of a two-front war and by thought Germany must attack first in the west, well ahead of Schlieffen's later conclusion. Moltke's successor, General Alfred von Waldersee, continued to worry about a major French assault against Lorraine, thereby anticipating Schlieffen's own fixation with the same problem.

A newly available German staff memorandum, written by Major Wilhelm Dieckmann in the s, allows Zuber to examine Schlieffen's staff rides, war games, and memoranda between and Although the documents for the study were destroyed, this account has survived. The new source can be usefully supplemented with Robert T.

Foley's recent edition and translation of Schlieffen's writings. From these records Zuber concludes that the famous Denkschrift cannot be called a war plan; in fact, it remained in its original form in a family cupboard until While its general concepts were well known among the Prussian Staff, Zuber thinks the actual study only indirectly influenced Moltke.

For the author, the memorandum represents a detailed concept paper that called, as had some earlier exercises, for an initial German attack in the west, moving through Belgium and Holland on the way to France in a sweep possibly going west of Paris. But the schema did not foresee war with Russia and made use of nonexistent troops, hence Zuber's claim that it was an argument for more troops, not a real war plan.

Indeed, he notes that Schlieffen's final war game in November-December tested few of the assumptions behind the famous memorandum, thus more proof that it was a manpower paper, not an operational plan.

At the same time he reminds readers that Schlieffen always fretted about a French attack in Lorraine, finally believing that superior use of Germany's internal rail network could offset the danger Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide.

Forged from a partnership between a university press and a library, Project MUSE is a trusted part of the academic and scholarly community it serves. Built on the Johns Hopkins University Campus.

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless. Institutional Login. LOG IN. The Journal of Military History. In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: The Journal of Military History If you would like to authenticate using a different subscribed institution or have your own login and password to Project MUSE.

Additional Information. Project MUSE Mission Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide. Eliot Prose. Contact Contact Us Help.

ESMERALDO DE SITU ORBIS PDF

Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914

Terence Zuber. Almost every Western Civilization class includes a well-rehearsed and well-intended lecture on the tenuous nature of historical "truth. Yet, almost unavoidably, we will at some point in the semester confidently offer our students an explanation or narrative so widely accepted it simply must be correct. Then, every so often, someone comes along to challenge that explanation. Terence Zuber takes on one of the most widely repeated stories of freshman level Western Civilization: the Schlieffen Plan. As told in most classes, a single plan for military operations, drawn up by Alfred von Schlieffen in , governed German actions in

ELEMENTS OF ELECTROMAGNETICS SADIKU 3RD EDITION PDF

Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning, 1871-1914

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of 20th-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, and disdainful of both politics and of public morality. In the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne. Yet it has always been recognised that the Schlieffen plan incl Yet it has always been recognised that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies, which have never been satisfactorily explained. Keywords: Schlieffen plan , war plan , war guilt , intelligence estimate , war game , Balkan war , battle of the Marne , militarism , France.

A STARTDOCPRINTER CALL WAS NOT ISSUED PDF

McFall on Zuber, 'Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning 1871-1914'

David G. Herrmann, Terence Zuber. New York: Oxford University Press. Terence Zuber introduces significant new evidence where documentation has been chronically thin in the debate about military strategy and the origins of World War I.

GALILEO COMPUTING OBJEKTORIENTIERTE PROGRAMMIERUNG PDF

.

Related Articles